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11 Introduction
A central question that the mechanism design literature tries to address is
the design of institutions that optimally allocate goods among privately in-
formed traders. In fact, whenever the number of agents is small and the
assumption of complete information does not hold, the strategic behavior
of the agents might prevent the economy at hand from achieving the com-
petitive equilibrium outcome, which is well known to be Pareto e￿cient.
Therefore, one of the objectives of mechanism design is to ￿nd institutions
that allow to achieve Pareto e￿ciency even when the assumptions on which
the competitive equilibrium rests are not satis￿ed; or institutions that are
in some sense optimal even when we are in presence of some form of market
failure.
In addition, the study of mechanisms provides insights on the process
of price formation, on which the classical theory of competitive equilibrium
is somewhat silent. The theory of competitive equilibrium says that prices
adjust automatically to clear markets, as if they were driven by some ￿in-
visible hand￿. Thus, studying trading mechanisms might help explain what
are the actual forces that drive prices towards the equilibrium, and whether
di￿erent market structures have di￿erent implications in the process of price
adjustment.
Since the seminal paper of Myerson and Satterthwaite [8], the literature
on optimal trading mechanisms has grown rapidly and a number of results
have been achieved. In their work, Myerson and Satterthwaite show that,
in the presence of incomplete information about traders’ valuations, an Ex-
Post E￿cient (henceforth Ex-Post EFF), Ex-Post Budget Balanced (Ex-Post
BB), Bayesian Incentive Compatible (Bayesian IC)1, Interim Individually
Rational (Interim IR) mechanism to allocate an indivisible good between
a buyer and a seller does not in general exist. Given this impossibility
result, they characterize second best mechanisms, i.e. mechanisms that are
BB, IC, IR and maximize the joint expected welfare (Ex-Ante EFF). Their
analysis is carried on assuming linear utilities. The only condition is that
the supports of the distributions of types have a nonempty intersection, i.e.
it is not common knowledge that there are positive gains from trade. The
impossibility result by Myerson and Satterthwaite has been then generalized
to the case of quasilinear utilities and multiple buyers/sellers2.
Cramton, Gibbons and Klemperer [1] have demonstrated that the im-
possibility result by Myerson and Satterthwaite [8] rests crucially on the
hypothesis that the agents are ex-ante identi￿ed, i.e. it is commonly known
which is the (potential) seller and which is the (potential) buyer. In Myerson
and Satterthwaite this is done by simply assuming that the only good to be
1Bayesian IC is equivalent to Interim IC. In the following, Bayesian and Interim IC
will be used interchangeably.
2See Williams [10].
2traded is initially owned by one of the agents, so that trade can take only one
direction. However, when the agents are not ex-ante identi￿ed, i.e. when it
is not commonly known who is going to be the seller and who is going to be
the buyer, the impossibility result is replaced by a possibility result: under
proper conditions, it is possible to design an Ex-Post BB, Bayesian IC, In-
terim IR trading mechanism that always gives rise to an e￿cient allocation.
The hypothesis of unidenti￿ed traders is introduced by simply assuming that
the only good to be traded is initially jointly owned by the agents. Cramton,
Gibbons and Klemperer show that, in an environment with n agents, linear
utilities and equally distributed types, e￿ciency can be achieved provided
that traders have equal or nearly equal initial endowments. Notice that in
their paper the problem is formulated in terms of partnership: every agent
initially owns a share of a single asset and the objective is to dissolve this
partnership e￿ciently. However, the result holds also when we consider the
problem of designing an e￿cient trading mechanism between a number of
agents, each endowed with some quantity of a homogeneous good.
The subsequent literature has tried to generalize and enrich these two
fundamental results in several directions. The main purpose of this strand of
literature was to characterize other possibility/impossibility results. Clearly,
the conclusions one gets are strictly related to the number and the types of
constraints one introduces. Moreover, it has been argued that a desirable
mechanism should not be too sensitive to the particular environment under
investigation, i.e. it should be ￿robust￿; very often, a trade-o￿ arises between
robustness and e￿ciency.
Makowski and Mezzetti [6] unify the impossibility result of Myerson and
Satterthwaite [8] and the possibility result of Cramton, Gibbons and Klem-
perer [1] by providing necessary and su￿cient conditions for the existence of
(1) an Ex-Post EFF, Ex-Post BB, Bayesian IC, Interim IR mechanism; and
of (2) an Ex-Post EFF, Ex-Ante BB, Dominant Strategy IC3, Ex-Post IR
mechanism. Their analysis considers a quite general environment (n traders,
quasilinear utilities, general distributions of types).
Williams [10] generalizes the Myerson and Satterthwaite [8] bilateral
trading problem to a multilateral setting with m buyers and n sellers. He
shows that the existence of an Ex-Post EFF, Ex-Ante BB, Bayesian IC, In-
terim IR mechanism depends upon the relative sizes of m and n and upon
the supports and distributions of valuations. These two last papers make ex-
tensive use of the equivalence between e￿cient, incentive compatible mech-
anisms and Groves mechanisms.
Hagerty and Rogerson [3] focus on robust trading mechanisms, where by
robust they mean mechanisms that are Dominant Strategy IC and Ex-Post
IR. Such mechanisms are robust in the sense that they are independent of
agents’ beliefs. For the bilateral trading setting of Myerson and Satterthwaite
3Dominant Strategy IC is equivalent to Ex-Post IC.
3[8], they show that the only mechanisms that satisfy Ex-Post BB, Dominant
Strategy IC and Ex-Post IR are posted price mechanisms, which are clearly
ine￿cient.
Recently, Schweizer [9] has summarized the su￿cient conditions for the
existence of an Ex-Post EFF, Ex-Post BB, Bayesian IC, Interim IR trading
mechanism, for any prior distribution of valuations. Other signi￿cant con-
tributions in this ￿eld include Gresik [2], Mookherjee and Reichelstein [7],
Kosmopoulou and Williams [5], Kosmopoulou [4].
2 Objective
We could brie￿y summarize the literature on this topic saying that, for the
case of identi￿ed traders, a possibility or impossibility result has been estab-
lished for any conceivable set of requirements.
On the other hand, when traders are unidenti￿ed, i.e. every trader might
end up being a net buyer or a net seller, there is still at least a gap to be ￿lled:
to our knowledge, nothing has yet been said on the possibility/impossibility
of designing a mechanism that is simultaneously Ex-Post EFF, Ex-Post BB,
Interim IC, Ex-Post IR. In fact, Cramton, Gibbons and Klemperer [1] have
established a possibility result when IR is required to hold only at the Interim
stage. And Makowski and Mezzetti [6] have shown an impossibility result
when IC is required to hold Ex-Post. We put ourselves in between and ask
ourselves: When agents are not ex ante identi￿ed, is it possible to design
an E￿cient trading mechanism that is Ex-Post Budget Balanced, Interim
Incentive Compatible and Ex-Post Individually Rational? Answering to this
question is the aim of this paper.
The last requirement is what distinguishes our approach from most of
the existing literature. In Cramton, Gibbons and Klemperer [1], the Indi-
vidual Rationality constraint is required to hold only at the Interim stage.
This means that each trader can decide whether or not to participate in
the mechanism, but this decision has to be made without knowing others’
private information. In that framework, an agent will decide to take part in
the mechanism whenever his expected net payo￿ from participating is non-
negative. However, it may well happen that the actual net payo￿ he gets,
i.e. his ex-post net payo￿, is negative. On the other hand, Ex-Post IR allows
a trader to learn the terms of trade before deciding whether or not to accept
the deal and this rules out the possibility that the agent ends up with a neg-
ative net payo￿; hence, no trader will ever regret the choice he made. This
makes Ex-Post IR much more appealing than Interim IR. In fact, in most
markets each trader has the ability to refuse to trade when the negotiated
terms give him negative net utility. And even if the designer is a government
agency with some power to bind traders to the outcomes emerging from the
mechanism, the designer may want to avoid costly court battles to enforce
4them. Moreover, if agents have limited liability, an Ex-Post IR mechanism
is the only viable alternative. However, Ex-Post IR is a more restrictive
constraint than Interim IR and thus Ex-Post IR mechanisms constitute a
subset of Interim IR mechanisms. Is this subset empty?
The interest in this issue is thus both technical and substantial: on the
one hand, it enlarges the range of possibility/impossibility results for trading
mechanisms. On the other hand, an e￿cient trading mechanism that is also
Ex-Post IR is more ￿robust￿ than an Interim IR one, and is thus preferable.
3 The model
The model we adopt is standard in the literature. Consider the following
social choice problem: there are 2 agents, each agent i is endowed with a
quantity si of some homogeneuos good. Let us normalize the si’s so that
s1 + s2 = 1. In other words, in the economy there is a total endowment of
one unit of a good and each agent owns a share of it. The initial endowments
are common knowledge.
Let A be the set of all the possible allocations of the good among the
agents and let a = (a1;a2) be a general element of A, where ai represents
the share allocated to agent i. Clearly, a1 + a2 = 1. Each agent i has quasi-
linear preferences over the set of allocations and money given by the utility
function:
ui(a;ti;vi) = ¼i(a;vi) + ti
where ti is any money transfer to agent i. The parameter vi 2 Vi is the type
of agent i and is private information. It can be interpreted as the valuation
of the good to the agent. However, it is commonly known that types are
independent random variables and that vi has marginal distribution Fi with
strictly positive density fi over its support.
The social choice problem consists in ￿nding a trading mechanism that, in
equilibrium, allocates the good among the agents in some desirable manner.
As it is well known from the revelation principle, any Bayesian equilib-
rium outcome of any conceivable mechanism can be obtained as the equi-
librium outcome of a direct mechanism in which players truthfully report
their types. Thus, there is no loss of generality in restricting our attention
to direct mechanisms.
A direct mechanism is a pair of functions fa;tg, where a : V1£V2 ! A is
an allocation function and t = (t1;t2) : V1 £ V2 ! Rn is a transfer function.
We look for a direct mechanism where truthful reporting is an equilib-
rium, i.e. we look for an Incentive Compatible direct mechanism.
Moreover, we want that the mechanism be consistent with voluntary
participation, in other words we want it to be Individually Rational. This
requirement appears appropriate in this setting, as it is consistent with the
5idea that an agent cannot be forced to trade; in other social choice problems,
e.g. provision of a public good, this is not necessarily the case.
Typically, there are two additional properties that a desirable trading
mechanism should satisfy: one is E￿ciency (the allocation maximizes joint
welfare), the other is Budget Balance (there’s no need to subsidize agents).
This last property is natural in this context of exchange of goods among
private agents.
In this framework, time plays a crucial role. The sequence of events can
be divided in three temporal stages: at the ex-ante stage, each agent knows
only the distribution of types of all the agents; at the interim stage, each
agent has learned his own type but is still uncertain about the other agents’
types; at the ex-post stage, the types of all the agents are commonly known.
The behavioral assumptions and the properties that the mechanism should
satisfy can be de￿ned accordingly.
The three temporal stages are increasingly restrictive: a mechanism that
satis￿es an ex-post requirement will satisfy, a fortiori, also the corresponding
interim requirement; and a mechanism that satis￿es an interim requirement
will satisfy, a fortiori, the corresponding ex-ante requirement. The converse
is in general not true. The obvious implication is that a possibility result
still holds when the requirements are relaxed to a previous temporal stage;
correspondingly, an impossibility result immediately extends to the following
temporal stages.
Incentive Compatibility
A direct mechanism fa;tg determines an allocation and a vector of transfers
as a function of the reports of the agents. As we said before, by invoking the
revelation principle, we can restrict our attention to IC direct mechanisms
where truthtelling is an equilibrium. Now, according to the notion of equi-
librium adopted, one gets di￿erent IC constraints. In particular, we focus
on Interim (or Bayesian) IC, that is we require that honest reporting be a
Bayesian equilibrium of the game induced by the mechanism. In symbols,
for any agent i:
E¡i[ui(a(vi;v¡i);ti(vi;v¡i);vi)] ¸ E¡i[ui(a(ri;v¡i);ti(ri;v¡i);vi)]; 8vi;8ri
where E¡i means expectation taken with respect to the distributions of other
agents’ types and ri is the report by agent i.
Individual Rationality




i(v) is the outside option to agent i (i.e. the utility he gets by not
participating in the mechanism and keeping his initial share si).
If instead the above inequality holds only in expectation, we have the milder




An incentive compatible direct trading mechanism fa;tg is Ex-Post EFF if
the allocation function maximizes the total welfare of the economy, whatever






In the following, we assume that the above program has a solution. To avoid
introducing further notation, a(v) will denote such a solution.
Budget Balance
A direct trading mechanism fa;tg is Ex-Post BB if the transfers balance in
any possible state of the world:
2 X
k=1
tk(v) = 0; 8v:
Once we ￿nd an allocation function a(v) that is Ex-Post EFF, our prob-
lem reduces to ￿nding a transfer function t(v) that simultaneously satis￿es
Ex-Post BB, Interim IC and Ex-Post IR. Through the equivalence between
IC, EFF mechanisms and Groves mechanisms (see Makowski and Mezzetti
[6]), we can reformulate this problem in an equivalent, though more tractable
manner.
A Groves mechanism in expectations is a mechanism fa;tg such that:
(1) a is Ex-Post EFF and (2) the trading charges h1(v);h2(v) are lump sums
in expectations, that is 8i;8vi;v0
i:
E¡i[hi(vi;v¡i)] = E¡i[hi(v0
i;v¡i)] = Hi; (1)




¼k(a(v);vk) ¡ ¼i(a(v);vi) ¡ ti(v):





be the total welfare generated by the allocation a(v). Being a(v) the Ex-Post
EFF allocation, g(v) represents the maximum welfare that can be achieved
in the economy. The expectation of g(v) taken with respect to all agents and
to the other agent will be denoted by G and Gi(vi) respectively; that is,
G = E[g(v)]; Gi(vi) = E¡i[g(v)]:
With this new notation, the trading charges are:
hi(v) = g(v) ¡ ¼i(a(v);vi) ¡ ti(v); i = 1;2;
and ex-post utilities are:
ui(v) = ¼i(a(v);vi) + ti(v) = g(v) ¡ hi(v); i = 1;2: (2)
Equation (2) says that a Groves mechanism in expectations is a direct
mechanism that allocates the good e￿ciently and that gives each agent a
utility level equal to the total (maximal) welfare of the economy minus a
non distortionary trading charge.
The equivalence result states that, under independence of types, a mecha-
nism is Ex-Post EFF and Bayesian IC if and only if it is a Groves mechanism
in expectations4.
The idea behind this equivalence is the following. By giving to each agent
the total welfare generated by trade (which is the maximum achievable when
the allocation is e￿cient), the private bene￿t of each agent coincides with
the social bene￿t, and this guarantees that the agent will act accordingly to
the interest of the society. By subtracting a non-distortionary charge, that
is a charge whose expected value is independent on an agent’s true type, the
agent’s incentive to tell the truth is not a￿ected.
Let us now introduce the additional requirements of BB and IR. In terms
of Groves mechanisms, Ex-Post BB becomes:
h1(v) + h2(v) = g(v); 8v: (3)
Interim IR becomes:
Hi · G¡i(vi) ¡ E¡i[u0
i(v)]; 8i;8vi; (4)
while Ex-Post IR becomes:
hi(v) · g(v) ¡ u0
i(v); 8i;8v: (5)
4See Makowski and Mezzetti [6], Theorem 2.2, page 505.
8The basic Groves mechanism is a Groves mechanism where the non-
distortionary charges are set equal to zero, i.e. h1(v) = h2(v) = 0;8v. In
such a mechanism each agent is simply given the total welfare generated
by trade, i.e. u1(v) = u2(v) = g(v). Clearly, this mechanism generates a
budget de￿cit, given by g(v) (each agent’s ex-post utility is g(v), but the total
welfare that can be distributed is only g(v)). To cover this budget de￿cit, it
is su￿cient to impose positive charges to the agents. These charges must of
course be non-distortionary, in order not to violate Bayesian IC. However,
by increasing those charges, we run the risk of violating IR. It is precisely
this trade-o￿ between BB and IR that strictly constrains the possibility of
￿nding a Groves mechanism that also satis￿es BB and IR. The IR constraints
impose an upper bound to the trading charges that could make impossible
to raise enough money to cover the de￿cit.
4 Interim Individual Rationality
In the environment considered by Myerson and Satterthwaite [8], where BB is
required to hold Ex-Post while IR only at the Interim stage, such a trade-o￿
precludes the possibility of ￿nding a Groves mechanism that simultaneously
satis￿es BB and IR. In that framework, IR implies that the seller cannot be
taxed at all, and the maximum charge that can be imposed to the buyer is
not enough to ￿nance the de￿cit.
Cramton, Gibbons and Klemperer [1], instead, have shown that, when
agents are not identi￿ed, and when initial endowments are su￿ciently evenly
distributed, the upper bounds on trading charges imposed by Interim IR are
not strong enough to prevent from achieving BB.
Makowski and Mezzetti [6] have obtained a necessary and su￿cient con-
dition for the existence of an Ex-Post EFF, Ex-Post BB, Interim IC and
Interim IR mechanism for a general mechanism design problem. This condi-
tion encompasses both the result of Myerson and Satterthwaite [8] and that












(see also Williams [10] and Schweizer [9]).
Condition (6) can be interpreted as follows: on the left hand side we
have the expected value of the budget de￿cit generated by a basic Groves
mechanism, that is a Groves mechanism with no extra charges. To cover
such a de￿cit, we introduce trading charges h1(v);h2(v). These trading
charges have to be non distortionary, i.e. their expectations evaluated with
respect to other agents’ distributions of types, must be constants (equation
(1)). Moreover, the trading charge imposed to the i-th agent must not
violate the corresponding Interim IR, that is its expected value cannot exceed
9the expected value of the net utility agent i gets from participating in the
mechanism (equation (4)). But since Hi is a constant, we obtain the following








The sum of these upper bounds represents the maximum amount (in ex-
pected terms) that can be extracted from the agents without violating their
Interim IR constraints. If such an amount is su￿cient to cover the expected
budget de￿cit of a basic Groves mechanism, then a mechanism with the
desired properties does exist.
5 Ex-Post Individual Rationality: a Su￿cient Con-
dition for existence
Since Ex-Post IR is more restrictive than Interim IR, condition (6) is still
necessary but not su￿cient for the existence of an Ex-Post EFF, Ex-Post
BB, Interim IC and Ex-Post IR mechanism.
Ex-Post IR (condition (5)) imposes a tighter upper bound on the trading
charges that can be levied to ensure budget balance. One might expect
that such an upper bound is so strong a constraint that precludes existence.
However, this is not always the case. In Proposition 1, which is the main
result of this paper, we obtain a su￿cient condition for the existence of the
desired mechanism.
Proposition 1: Let a(v) be an Ex-Post E￿cient allocation and let g(v)
denote the total welfare generated by such an allocation when v is the realized

















then there exists an Ex-Post BB, Interim IC and Ex-Post IR trading mech-
anism that implements a(v).
Proof. The proof is by construction. Let a(v) be an Ex-Post EFF allo-
cation function. Our objective is to ￿nd trading charges, h1(v) and h2(v),
that simultaneously satisfy (i) Ex-Post BB (condition (3)), (ii) Interim IC
(condition (1)), (iii) Ex-Post IR (condition (5)).
We proceed as follows: we ￿rst construct a two-parameter set of functions
h1(v) and h2(v) that always satisfy Interim IC. Then, within this set, we op-
timally determine the value of the parameters in order to meet the Ex-Post
IR constraint. If these parameters are compatible with Ex-Post BB, then
existence is guaranteed.










+ Ci; i = 1;2: (8)
where Ci is a constant. Equation (8) de￿nes two families of functions pa-
rameterized by the constants C1 and C2. These functions satisfy Interim IC












































Ex-Post IR is thus satis￿ed if and only if Ci · C¤
i .
Finally, Ex-Post BB (condition (3)) requires that C1+C2 = 0. Therefore,
Ex-Post IR and Ex-Post BB can be simultaneously satis￿ed if and only if
C¤
1 + C¤
2 ¸ 0, which completes the proof.
In the proof of Proposition 1, the trading charges h1(v) and h2(v) (equa-
tion (8)) are constructed as follows. The ￿rst term, g(v)=2, is the budget
de￿cit generated by the basic Groves mechanism equally divided between
the two agents. This term is independent of i. The quantity between round
brackets is the di￿erence between the two agents’ expected total welfare.
In a sense, the budget de￿cit is ￿rst equally spread among the agents; but
then, an agent with higher than the average expected gains from trade is
acquainted a discount while an agent with lower than the average expected
gains from trade receives an additional charge. This additional term gives the
agent the right incentives to tell the truth, without a￿ecting budget balance.
Finally, a lump-sum term Ci is added or subtracted. Broadly speaking, the
aim of this lump-sum is to extract the maximum possible informational rent
from the trader which is in a better position. This sum is then transferred
to the other trader.
To see this, consider the trading charges corresponding to the case when










; i = 1;2:











Now, suppose that, for some agent, this quantity happens to be strictly
positive for all realizations of types, whereas the other agent’s net utility is
negative for some realization of types. Then it is possible for the designer to
apply an additional charge to the ￿rst agent to extract his informational rent.
In order not to violate Interim IC, this additional charge must be constant.
In order not to violate Ex-Post IR, this charge cannot exceed the net utility
of the agent in the worst case scenario (equation (9)). This lump-sum can
then be transferred to the other agent. If this transfer is su￿cient to meet
his Ex-Post IR constraint, we have an existence result.
6 Uniform types
Suppose that valuations are independent and uniformly distributed, with
partially overlapping supports. That is, v1 » U[0;1] and v2 » U[a;a +
1], with a 2 [0;1). Moreover, suppose traders are risk neutral with linear
utilities: ui(v) = siai(v) + ti(v);i = 1;2.
In this case, the ex-post e￿cient allocation is the one that assigns the
whole good to the agent with the highest valuation, i.e.:
a1(v1;v2) =
½
1 if v1 ¸ v2
0 otherwise
; a2(v1;v2) = 1 ¡ a1(v1;v2)









In particular, when the supports of valuations are equal (a = 0), we
get the condition that initial endowments have to be perfectly symmetric
(s1 = s2 = 1=2); in this case, C¤
1 = C¤









j) i = 1;2:
Notice that, with Interim IR, the (necessary and su￿cient) condition that
guarantees the existence of the Ex-Post EFF mechanism is that the initial
endowments must be su￿ciently symmetric; more precisely: s1 2 [1=2 ¡ p
3=6;1=2 +
p
3=6]5. Here, instead, existence is guaranteed if endowments
are exactly symmetric6. In other words, making the IR constraint more
restrictive cause the interval of endowments that ensure existence to shrink
5See Makowski and Mezzetti [6].
6It is worth reminding that our condition is only su￿cient.
12to a single point, that is the center of that interval. The reason is the
following: when individual rationality must hold ex-post, the lump-sum part
of the trading charges cannot exceed the worst case scenario net ex-post
utility of the agent in the absence of lump sum charges (equation (9)). Now,
an agent with a low endowment has a net utility equal to zero in the worst
case scenario, which corresponds to the situation in which both agents have
null valuations for the good. In this case, the mechanism would assign a
worthless good to one of the agent, without requiring any payment. Instead,
an agent with high endowment has a strictly negative worst case scenario net
payo￿: the worst case scenario to him is the situation in which both agents
have the highest possible valuation, which would cause his trading charge
to exceed the utility he gets from acquiring the good. Clearly, the only
situation in which the sum of tyhe two agents’ worst case scenario net payo￿s
is nonnegative is the one associated to perfectly symmetric endowments.
The strategic reasoning behind the impossibility result of Myerson and
Satterthwaite [8] is basically this: a buyer has an incentive to undervalue
his willingness to pay, while a seller has an incentive to overvalue. This
incentives go in opposite directions and are so strong that can make trade
impossible even in situations where trade would be pro￿table. When agents
are not identi￿ed, instead, they don’t know whether they will be ex-post
buyers or sellers. Hence, the two opposite forces compensate each other (at
least partially), and this lowers the incentives necessary to induce the agents
to tell the truth.
These strategic forces are clearly at work in the result of equation (10),
which says that the initial endowments of the agent with ￿low￿ valuation
(agent 1) must be lower than that of the agent with ￿high￿ valuation (agent
2). The reason is the following: agent 1 knows that his own valuation is
likely to be lower than agent 2’s valuation. Thus, he expects that, with high
probability, he will be the seller because the other agent is likely to be more
eager to get the good than he is. On the other hand, he has a low initial
endowment of the good, and thus, if he gets the whole good, he will get
utility on a large fraction of the good. This makes him more willing to buy
than to sell. Therefore, there are two forces that go in opposite directions:
the ￿rst pushes agents 1 to behave more like a seller, while the second leads
him to behave more like a buyer. The opposite happens for agent 2. When
initial endowments are given by (10), these two forces compensate and agents
are willing to tell the truth.
7 Concluding remarks
In this paper we consider a bilateral trading framework with privately in-
formed agents where traders are not ex ante identi￿ed, i.e. it is not com-
monly known who is the buyer and who is the seller. We start from the
13existence result ￿rst obtained by Cramton, Gibbons and Klemperer [1] and
then generalized by Makowski and Mezzetti [6], which says that an Ex-Post
E￿cient, Ex-Post Budget Balanced, Bayesian Incentive Compatible and In-
terim Individually Rational trading mechanism might exist, provided that
the environment satis￿es a particular condition. In the case of linear utilities
and uniformly distributed types, the condition is that agents have equal or
nearly equal initial endowments.
We show that, contrary to what one would expect, if we strengthen the
Individually Rational constraint from Interim to Ex-Post, at least in some
cases we still have a possibility result. We derive a su￿cient condition for the
existence of such a mechanism for the two agents’ case, and show an example
in which such a condition is satis￿ed for suitable values of the parameters.
Ex-Post IR is a much more restrictive requirement than Interim IR because
it requires that, even in the worst case scenario, each agent yields (or at
least does not lose) from taking part in the mechanism. Therefore, not only
it is consistent with no agents ever feeling regret, but it is clearly the only
practicable choice when agents have limited liability or when it is not possible
to bind them.
The condition is only su￿cient, not necessary. Thus, our result is still
partial, but at least shows that it is sometimes possible to design Ex-Post
IR institutions without giving up e￿ciency. A natural development of our
work would be to give an answer to the case of n agents. In fact, when there
are n agents and types are uniformly distributed over the unit interval, our
condition becomes vacuous, in the sense that it is never satis￿ed. This seems
in contrast with the common sense which suggests that, as the market gets
larger, it is ￿easier￿ to get e￿ciency.
Appendix
Suppose v1 and v2 are independent and uniformly distributed with supports
V1 = [0;1] and V2 = [a;a + 1], with a 2 [0;1) and that ui(v) = siai(v) +
ti(v);i = 1;2. Let V = V1 £ V2.
In this environment, the Ex-Post e￿cient allocation is the one that as-
signs the whole good to the agent with the highest valuation7, i.e.:
a1(v1;v2) =
½
1 if v1 ¸ v2
0 otherwise
; a2(v1;v2) = 1 ¡ a1(v1;v2)
and the total welfare associated to this allocation is g(v) = maxfv1;v2g.
The expected welfare to agent 1 is given by:
G1(v1) = E¡1[g(v)] =
½ 1
2v2
1 ¡ av1 + 1
2(a + 1)2 if a < v1 · 1
a + 1
2 if 0 · v1 · a
;
7We assume that, in case of a tie, the good is assigned to agent 1.
14while the expected welfare to agent 2 is given by:
G2(v2) = E¡2[g(v)] =
½
v2 if 1 < v2 · a + 1
1
2(1 + v2) if a · v2 · 1
:


























¡ (1 ¡ s1)v2
o
:
Because the objective function is clearly discontinuous, we divide the admis-
sible set V in ￿ve regions and compute the in￿mum of the objective function
within each region. We then pick the minimum of them.
Region 1: v1 2 [0;a]; v2 2 (1;a + 1].
The objective function for agent 1 is: 1
2v2 + 1
2(a + 1
2 ¡ v2) ¡ s1v1.
The minimum point is (v1 = a; v2 2 V2) and the minimum is: (1
2 ¡s1)a+ 1
4.
The objective function for agent 2 is: 1
2v2 + 1
2(v2 ¡ a ¡ 1
2) ¡ (1 ¡ s1)v2.
The in￿mum corresponds to v2 ! 1+ and is: s1 ¡ 1
4(1 + 2a).
Region 2: v1 2 (a;1]; v2 2 (1;a + 1].






² If s1 · 1¡a
2 , the minimum point is (v1 = a + 2s1; v2 2 V2) and the
minimum is ¡s2
1 + as1 + 1
2a + 1
4.
² If s1 > 1¡a








1 +av1 ¡ 1
2(a+1)2)¡
(1 ¡ s1)v2.
The in￿mum corresponds to (v1 = 1;v2 ! 1+) and is: s1 ¡ 1
4(2 + a2).
Region 3: v1 2 [0;a]; v2 2 [a;1].






The minimum point is (v1 = a; v2 = a) and the minimum is (1 ¡ s1 ¡ 1
4a)a.






² If s1 · 1¡a
2 , the minimum point is (v1 2 V1;v2 = 1 ¡ 2s1) and the
minimum is s1(1 ¡ s1) ¡ 1
4(1 + 2a).
² If s1 > 1¡a
2 , the minimum point is (v1 2 V1;v2 = a) and the minimum
is (s1 + 1
4a ¡ 1)a.
Region 4: v1 2 (a;1]; v2 2 (v1;1].









15² If s1 · 1¡a
2 , the in￿mum corresponds to (v1 ! a+;v2 ! a+) and is:
(1 ¡ s1 ¡ 1
4a)a.
² If s1 > 1¡a










1 +av1 ¡ 1
2(a+
1)2) ¡ (1 ¡ s1)v2.
² If s1 · 1¡a
2 , the minimum point is (v1 = 1;v2 = 1) and the minimum
is: s1 ¡ 1
4(2 + a2).
² If s1 > 1¡a
2 , the in￿mum corresponds to (v1 ! a+;v2 ! a+) and is:
(s1 + 1
4a ¡ 1)a.
Region 5: v1 2 (a;1]; v2 2 [a;v1].









² If s1 · 1¡a
2 , the in￿mum corresponds to (v1 ! a+;v2 ! a+) and is:
(1 ¡ s1 ¡ 1
4a)a.
² If s1 > 1¡a










1 +av1 ¡ 1
2(a+
1)2) ¡ (1 ¡ s1)v2.
² If s1 · 1¡a
2 , the minimum point is (v1 = 1;v2 = 1) and the minimum
is: s1 ¡ 1
4(2 + a2).
² If s1 > 1¡a
2 , the in￿mum corresponds to (v1 ! a+;v2 ! a+) and is:
(s1 + 1
4a ¡ 1)a.
By comparing the in￿ma in the ￿ve regions above, we conclude that:
² if s1 · 1¡a
2 , C¤
1 = (1 ¡ s1 ¡ 1
4a)a, C¤
2 = s1 ¡ 1
4(2 + a2);




4a2 ¡ s1, C¤
2 = (s1 + 1
4a ¡ 1)a.
Finally, we have that C¤
1 + C¤
2 ¸ 0 if and only if s1 = 1¡a
2 (in this case
C¤
1 = 1
4a(a + 2) and C¤
2 = 1
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